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Dodd-Frank financial reform bill
The Dodd-Frank (D-F) bill establishes the Financial
Services Oversight Council. The bill authorizes the
Federal Reserve Board to act as agent for the Council
to monitor the financial services marketplace to iden-
tify potential threats to the stability of the US finan-
cial system and to identify global trends and develop-
ments that could pose systemic risks to the stability of
the US economy and to other economies.
Is the Fed capable of fulfilling these requirements?
Shojai and Feiger (2010), in their article Economists’
Hubris – The Case for Risk Management – write that
the tools that are currently at the disposal of the
world’s major global financial institutions are not
adequate to help them prevent such crises in the
future and that the current structure of these institu-
tions makes it literally impossible to avoid the kind of
failures that we have witnessed. I evaluate what
Greenspan has learned and develop the Stochastic
Optimal Control approach that should be used to
implement the D-F bill.
Greenspan’s retrospective
Greenspan’s paper (2010) presents his retrospective
view of the crisis. His theme has several parts. First,
the decline and convergence of world real long-term
interest rates – not Federal Reserve monetary policy –
led to significant housing price appreciation, a hous-
ing price bubble. Second, this bubble was leveraged by
debt. There was a heavy securitization of subprime
mortgages. In the years leading to the current crisis,
financial intermediation tried to function on too thin
layer of capital – high leverage – owing to a misread-
ing of the degree of risk embodied in ever more com-
plex financial products and markets. Third, when the
bubble unraveled, the leveraging set off a series of
defaults. Fourth, the breakdown of the bubble was
unpredictable and inevitable, given the ‘excessive’
leverage – or unduly low capital – of the financial
intermediaries.
Prior to the subprime crisis of 2007, there was a false
sense of safety in financial markets. Alan Greenspan
said in 2004 that “the surge in mortgage re-financings
likely improved rather than worsened the financial
condition of the average homeowner”. Moreover
“overall, the household sector seems to be in good
shape, and much of the apparent increase in the
household sector’s debt ratios in the past decade
reflects factors that do not suggest increasing house-
hold financial stress” (Greenspan 2004a and 2004b).
The market and the Fed did not consider these mort-
gages to be very risky. By 2007 a measure of risk, the
yield spread (CCC bonds – 10 year US Treasury), fell
to a record low. 
When the crisis came in 2008, Greenspan said: “those
of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending
institutions to protect stockholders’ equity, myself
included, are in a state of disbelief”. The lesson for the
future that he has learned is that it is imperative that
there must be an increase in regulatory capital and liq-
uidity requirements by banks (Greenspan 2010). 
My basic questions are: what is an optimal leverage or
capital requirement that balances the expected growth
against risk? What are theoretically founded – not ad
hoc empirical – early warning signals of a crisis? I
explain why the application of stochastic optimal con-
trol (SOC) is the effective approach to determine the
optimal degree of leverage, the optimum and exces-
sive risk and the probability of a debt crisis. 
I show that the theoretically derived early warning sig-
nal (EWS) of a crisis is the excess debt ratio, equal to
the difference between the actual and optimal ratio.
The excess debt of households starting from
2004–2005 indicated that a housing crisis was most
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Maital for excellent suggestions.likely. This SOC analysis should be used by those
charged with surveillance of financial markets. It is
hoped that the Fed will not be like the ancien régime:
“Ils n’ont rien appris, ni rien oublié”.
Stochastic optimal control (SOC)/dynamic risk 
management 
The financial crisis was precipitated by the mortgage
crisis and spread through the financial sector due to
high leverage. I focus upon the housing sector, which
was has been at the origin of the crisis. At the begin-
ning of the financial chain are the mortgagors/debtors
who borrow from financial intermediaries – banks,
hedge funds, government sponsored enterprises. The
latter are creditors of the mortgagors, but ultimately
are debtors to banks or to institutional investors at
the other end. For example, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA) borrows in the world
bond market and uses the funds to purchase or later
resell packages of mortgages. If the mortgagors fail to
meet their debt payments, the effects are felt all along
the line. The stability of the financial intermediaries
and the value of the traded derivatives – CDO and
CDS – ultimately depend upon the ability of the
mortgagors to service their debts. When the mort-
gagors default, the whole leveraged financial structure
collapses.
SOC is dynamic optimization where key variables are
stochastic. A sketch of the SOC approach will facili-
tate understanding the analysis below. Technical
mathematical details are in my recent papers (Stein
2010 and 2011). The criterion/object is to maximize
the expected logarithm of household net worth at a
future date. This is a risk-averse strategy because the
logarithm is a concave function. Declines in net worth
are weighted more heavily than increases in net worth.
In fact very severe penalties are placed upon bank-
ruptcy – a zero net worth. This criterion is the growth
variable that will optimally balance expected growth
and risk.
The growth of net worth is affected by leverage. An
increase in debt to finance the purchase of assets
increases net worth by the return on investment, but
decreases the growth of net worth by the associated
interest payments. The return on investment has two
components. The first is the productivity of assets and
the second is the capital gain on the assets. An increase
in leverage will increase expected growth if the return
on investment exceeds the interest rate. The produc-
tivity of assets is observed, but the future capital gain
and the interest rates are unknown when the invest-
ment decision is made. The true stochastic process is
unknown. One must specify the stochastic process on
the capital gain and interest rate if one wants to select
the optimal leverage – to maximize the expected loga-
rithm of future net worth. 
The SOC approach derives an optimal debt ratio con-
ditional upon the stochastic processes. Alternative
stochastic processes imply different optimal debt
ratios. My standard of optimality is based upon sus-
tainable stochastic processes concerning the capital
gain and interest rate. By contrast, the market opti-
mized on the basis of unsustainable stochastic
processes, which led to the bubble and its subsequent
collapse.
A sustainable stochastic process is as follows. Call this
the Prototype Model. Reasonable variations imply
similar qualitative but not quantitative results. The
capital gain is the sum of two terms: a constant drift
and a Brownian motion term. The interest rate has a
similar structure: a constant drift plus a Brownian
motion term. The capital gain and interest rate are
negatively correlated. The drift of the capital gain is
constrained not to exceed the drift of the interest rate,
to preclude the ‘free lunch’ described below.
Given the stochastic process, an optimal leverage or
capital requirement is derived as follows. The expect-
ed growth of net worth is a concave function of the
leverage. It is maximal when the optimal leverage is
chosen. As the leverage exceeds the derived optimal,
the expected growth declines and the variance/risk
rises. If the debt ratio is less than the optimal, expect-
ed growth is unduly sacrificed to reduce risk. Leverage
is equal to one plus the debt ratio; and the capital
requirement is the inverse of the leverage. I focus
upon the debt ratio, and the other ratios follow.
The main theoretical results are as follows. (1) The
optimal debt ratio is not a number, but a function. It
is proportional to: the drift of the capital gain less the
drift of the rate of interest plus the current productiv-
ity of capital less a risk premium. The factor of pro-
portionality is the reciprocal of risk elements.
Therefore the optimal debt ratio or capital require-
ment will vary among sectors and over time. One size
does not fit all. (2) Define the excess debt as the actu-
al debt ratio less the optimal ratio. For a sufficiently
high excess debt, the expected growth is zero or nega-
tive and the variance is high. The probability of a
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decline in net worth or a debt crisis is directly related
to the excess debt ratio. 
The market selected a debt ratio based upon an illu-
sion of a ‘free lunch’ – an unsustainable stochastic
process. The market estimated the drift of capital
gains on the basis of recent price changes. The recent
capital gains exceeded the interest rate so that the
mortgagors thought that they were getting a free
lunch. The rises in housing prices and in owner equi-
ty induced a demand for mortgages by banks and
funds. The mortgagors borrowed at an interest rate
below the capital gain. In about 45-55 percent of the
cases, the purpose of the subprime mortgage taken
out in 2006 was to extract cash by refinancing an
existing mortgage loan into a larger mortgage loan.
They expected to repay the loan plus interest from the
higher value of the home, due to the capital gain. The
quality of loans declined. The share of loans with full
documentation substantially decreased from 69 per-
cent in 2001 to 45 percent in 2006 (see Demyanyk and
Van Hemert 2007). The ratio of debt/income rose
drastically. The only way to service or refinance the
debt was for the capital gain to exceed the interest
rate. This is an unsustainable situation since it implies
that there is a ‘free lunch’ or that the present value of
the asset diverges to infinity. 
Is the Fed capable of implementing the D-F bill? The
Fed, IMF, Treasury and the ‘Quants’/market lacked
the appropriate tools of analysis to answer the follow-
ing questions: what is an optimal leverage or capital
requirement that balances the expected growth against
risk? On the basis of the SOC analysis, I derive the
Early Warning Signals of the crisis. The excess debt
starting from 2004–2005 indicated that a crisis was
most likely. This SOC analysis should be used by those
charged with surveillance of financial markets. 
The basic equations: Prototype Model
The formal structure of the Prototype Model is the
subject of this part. The reader is referred to Stein
(2010 and 2011) and to Fleming and Stein (2004) for
the mathematical details. The empirical implications
for an EWS are in the later sections.
Criterion function
As my criterion of performance, I consider maximiz-
ing the expected logarithm of net worth of the mort-
gagors. I focus upon the net worth of the mortgagors
for two reasons. First, the entire structure of the
derivatives rested upon the ability of the mortgagors
to repay their debts. Hence I ask what the optimal
debt ratio of the mortgagors is. Second, I derive an
Early Warning Signal (EWS) that a bubble, the hous-
ing price bubble, is likely to collapse.
Let W(X,T) be the expected logarithm of net worth
X(T) at time T relative to its initial value X(0). The
stochastic optimal control problem is to select debt
ratios f(t) = L(t)/X(t) during the period (0,T) that
will maximize W(T) in equation (1). The maximum
value is W*(X,T). The optimal debt/net worth
ratio f*(t) plus one is the optimal leverage, and will
vary over time. The solution of the stochastic opti-
mal control/dynamic risk management problem
tells us what an optimal and what an ‘excessive’
leverage is.
(1) W*(X,T) = maxf E ln [X(T)/X(0)], 
f = L/X = debt/net worth; leverage = assets/net
worth = 1 + f
The logarithm ln(X) is a concave function of X(T). As
the expectation E[X(T)] goes to zero, the logarithm ln
[E(X(T)] goes to minus infinity. Therefore the expec-
tation E[ln X(T)] would go to minus infinity as
E[X(T)] goes to zero. Low values of net worth close to
zero may not be likely, but they have large negative
utility weights. Hence the criterion function reflects
strong risk aversion. Bankruptcy X = 0 is severely
penalized.
Dynamics of net worth
The mortgagors have a net worth X(t) equal to the
value of assets A(t) less debt L(t), see equation (2).
The value of assets A(t) = P(t)Q(t) is the product of a
deterministic physical quantity Q(t), for example an
index of the ‘quantity’ of housing, times the stochas-
tic price P(t) of the capital asset which is the housing
price index.
(2) X(t) = A(t) – L(t) = P(t)Q(t) – L(t), while
A(t) = P(t)Q(t).
The control variable is the debt ratio. The next steps
are to explain the stochastic differential equation for
net worth, relate it to the debt ratio, and specify what
are the sources and characteristics of the risk and
uncertainty.In view of equations (1) and (2), focus upon the
change in net worth dX(t) of the mortgagors. It is
the equal to the change in the value of assets dA(t)
less the change in debt dL(t). The change in the
value of assets dA(t) = d(P(t)Q(t)) shown in equa-
tion (3) has two components. The first is the change
due to the change in price of capital asset, which is
the capital gain or loss term, A(t)(dP(t)/P(t)). The
second is investment in housing I(t) = P(t) dQ(t),
the change in the quantity times the price.
(3) dA(t) = d(P(t)Q(t)) = Q(t)dP(t) + P(t)dQ(t) = 
A(t)dP(t)/P(t) + I(t) 
The change in debt dL(t), equation (4), is the sum
of expenditures less income. Expenditures are the
debt service i(t)L(t) at interest rate i(t), plus invest-
ment I(t) = P(t) dQ(t) plus C(t) the sum of con-
sumption, dividends and distributed profits.
Income Y(t) = ß(t)A(t) is the product of assets A(t)
times its productivity. Variable ß(t) corresponds to
the imputed rental income from housing divided by
the value of housing. This equation can be
expressed as (4a) where saving S(t) = ß(t)A(t) – C(t)
and investment is I(t). Thus the change in debt is
the sum of interest payments plus investment less
saving.
(4)   dL(t) = i(t)L(t) + P(t)dQ(t) + C(t) – ß(t)A(t).
(4a) dL(t) = i(t)L(t) + I(t) – S(t).
Combining these effects, the change in net worth
dX(t) = dA(t) – dL(t) can be shown
(5) dX(t) = dA(t) – dL(t) = A(t)[dP(t)/ P(t) + ß(t) dt] 
– i(t)L(t) – C(t) dt. 
Since net worth is the value of assets less debt, equa-
tion (6) describes the dynamics of net worth equation
(5) in terms of the ratio f(t) = L(t)/X(t) of debt/ net
worth and an arbitrary consumption ratio c(t) =
C(t)/X(t) ≥ 0. Since leverage A(t)/X(t) = (1+f(t)), the
control variable could be either f(t) the debt ratio or
the leverage. 
(6) dX(t) = X(t) {(1 + f(t)) [dP(t)/P(t) + ß(t) dt] – 
i(t) f(t) – c(t) dt}.
The mortgagors borrow at interest rate i(t) and bene-
fit from the capital gain dP(t)/P(t). Both variables are
stochastic/unpredictable. What is the optimum debt
ratio, leverage or capital requirement?
The optimization of equation (1) subject to equation
(6) depends upon the stochastic processes underlying
the capital gain dP(t)/P(t), productivity of capital ß(t)
and interest rate i(t) variables. The productivity of
capital ß(t) is deterministic and observable but
changes over time. However the change in price dP(t)
from t to t+dt and future interest rates are unpre-
dictable, given all the information through present
time t. The derived optimal debt ratio, leverage or
capital requirement will depend upon the specifica-
tion of the stochastic processes of the capital gain and
interest rate. 
Optimization in the Prototype Model 
The Prototype Model that I use for optimization
describes the stochastic process of the capital gain as
equation (7) and the interest rate as equation (8). The
capital gain dP(t)/P(t) has a constant drift or mean
π dt and a diffusion or stochastic term σpdwp. The
expectation of the stochastic term is zero and its vari-
ance is σp2dt. Similarly the interest rate has a mean or
expectation of i dt and a variance of σi2dt. The corre-
lation between the capital gain and interest rate is
E(dwpdwi) = ρ dt, 1 ≥ ρ ≥ –1.
(7) dP(t)/P(t) = π dt + σp dwp.
(8) i(t) = i dt + σidwi
E dwp = E dwi = 0, E(dwi2) = dt, E (dwp2) = dt, 
E(dwidwp) = ρ dt.
The maximization of expected net worth, equation
(1), subject to the stochastic processes, equations
(6)–(8), implies equation (9) for f*(t) the optimal ratio
of debt/net worth. Since leverage is equal to one plus
the debt ratio and capital requirement is the recipro-
cal of leverage, equation (9) is the key theoretical
result:
(9) f*(t) =[[(π + ß(t) – i) – (σp2 – ρσiσp)]/[σp2 + σi2 – 
2 ρσiσp] ≥ 0.
The economic meaning and implications of f*(t)
are explained in the next part. An empirically use-
ful upper bound on the optimal debt ratio in the pro-
totype model f**(t) occurs when the two distur-
bances are independent and the drift of the capital
gain is equal to that of the interest rate, equations
(9a) and (9b):
(9a) f*(t) < [(ß(t) – σp2]/[σp2 + σi2] ≥ 0.
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(9b) f**(t) = [(ß(t) – σp2]/[σp2 + σi2]
The ‘fundamentals’ that determine the optimal debt
ratio f*, leverage (1+f*) or capital requirements
1/(1+f*) are in the right hand side of equation (9). 
Economic implications of the optimum debt
ratio/leverage/capital requirements in the Prototype
Model
There are several important implications of equation
(9). First, the optimum debt ratio f*(t) is proportion-
al to the expected return (π + ß(t) – i) less a risk pre-
mium (σp2 – ρσiσp), where the factor of proportional-
ity is 1/[σp2 + σi2 – 2 ρσiσp], the risk elements. Optimal
leverage and capital requirements follow. Second, debt
will only be optimal if the expected return exceeds the
risk premium. Third, define excess debt Ψ(t) = f(t) –
f*(t) as the difference between the actual debt ratio f(t)
and the optimal f*(t). As the debt ratio exceeds the
optimum f*(t) there is an ‘excess debt’ and the expect-
ed growth declines. For sufficiently high debt ratio 
f-max, the expected growth is zero. A warning signal
that too much risk has been undertaken is that the
excess debt Ψ(t) = f(t) – f*(t) is large. Alternatively,
leverage is excessive when the debt ratio exceeds f*(t).
The probability of a crash increases with the excess
debt, and is very likely when f(t) > f-max. The capital
requirement A/X = 1/[1+f(t)] is optimal when f(t) =
f*(t) and is too low for debt ratios above f*(t). This is
general formulation that can be applied to any sector.
Equations (9) or (10) imply the optimal capital
requirement X*(t)/A(t). 
Application to housing sector: estimates of excess debt
as an early warning signal of a crisis
The financial crisis was precipitated by the mortgage
crisis. First, from 1995–2005 the decline in the 30-year
fixed rate mortgage interest rates (Figure 1) led to cap-
ital gains CAPGAIN (Figure 2). Second, the mort-
gagors and the financial intermediaries deluded them-
selves in thinking that the mean of the capital gain –
based upon the recent price experience – could con-
tinue to exceed the mean of the interest rate. Hence
the market thought that the ‘optimum’ debt ratio,
based upon π – i > 0, exceeded f**(t) in equation (9b).
They thought that the ‘free lunch’ could continue.
Third, a whole structure of financial derivatives was
based upon the ultimate debtors – the mortgagors.
Fourth, the financial intermediaries, whose assets and
liabilities were based upon the value of derivatives,
were very highly leveraged. Percentage changes in the
values of their net worth were large multiples of per-
centage changes in asset values. Fifth, the financial
intermediaries were closely linked – the assets of one
group were liabilities of another. The whole structure
of derivatives rested upon the mortgagors being able
Figure 1
THIRTY-YEAR CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE RATE IN THE US
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.to service their debts. Sixth, the collapse occurred
when the capital gain fell below the rate of interest:
the ‘free lunch’ was over. Defaults and bankruptcies
occurred. A cascade was precipitated by the mortgage
defaults. 
The application of the Prototype Model/SOC analy-
sis is done in several steps. First, on the basis of the
analysis, I derive estimates of the excess debt 
Ψ(t) = f(t) – f*(t) that lowered the expected return
and raised risk. Early warning signals (EWS) are
thereby derived. An Early Warning Signal of a debt
crisis is a series of excessive debts Ψ(t) = f(t) – f*(t)
> 0. When the debt ratio f(t) exceeds f-max, the
expected growth is negative and the risk is high. The
next question is: what are the appropriate measures
of the actual and the optimal debt ratio to evaluate
excess debt Ψ(t)? 
The debt ratio that I use in empirical work is the ratio
of household debt as a percent of disposable income,
since I do not have estimates of household net worth.
In order to make alterative measures of the debt ratio
and key economic variables comparable, I use nor-
malized variables where the normalization (N) of a
variable Z(t) called N(Z) = [Z(t) – mean Z]/standard
deviation. The mean of N(Z) is zero and its standard
deviation is unity. The normalized debt ratio is equa-
tion (10) and is graphed in Figure 3:
(10) DEBTRATIO = N[f(t)] = [debt/disposable 
income – mean]/standard deviation.
One cannot be sure what the correct stochastic
processes on the capital gain and interest rate are.
Therefore there is ambiguity concerning the exact
value of the optimal debt ratio
f*(t). For this reason I work with
f**(t) which is an upper bound of
the  optimum debt ratio based
upon equation (9b). A justifica-
tion is as follows. In the case of
the housing sector, historically
the mean capital gain 1980–2007
was π = 5.4 percent, with a stan-
dard deviation of 2.9 percent.
The 30-year conventional mort-
gage rate of interest from 1998 to
2007 ranged between 7.5 percent
and 6 percent. If we assume that
the difference (π – i) between the
mean interest rate and the mean
capital gain is not significant, and
the correlation ρ = 0, then an upper bound of the opti-
mal debt ratio f** for the housing sector is (9b). This
formulation is qualitatively, but not quantitatively,
consistent with alternative theoretical measures of the
optimum debt ratio implied by alternative stochastic
processes.
(9b) f** = L*/X = [ß(t) – σp2]/[σp2 + σi2] ≥ 0.
The term [ß(t) – σp2]/[σp2 + σi2] represents the ‘funda-
mental’ determinants of the optimal debt ratio. We
must estimate ß(t), the productivity of assets. The pro-
ductivity of housing assets is the (implicit net rental
income/value of the home) plus a convenience yield in
owning one’s home. Assume that the convenience
yield in owning a home has been relatively constant.
The productivity of assets ß(t) is rental income/value
assets = Y(t)/A(t) = Y(t)/Q(t)P(t), where Y(t) is rental
income, P(t) is an index of housing prices and Q(t) is
an index of the physical quantity of housing.
Therefore ß(t) is proportional to a ratio of rental
income to an index of housing prices.
(11) ß(t) ~ Y(t)/P(t)
An empirical proxy for f**(t) an upper bound of
the optimal debt ratio is RENTPRICE defined in
equation (12). Since the units of numerator and
denominator differ, it makes sense to use normal-
ized variables to estimate ß(t) the productivity of
assets. The term [(ß(t) – ß)] is the deviation of the
current return on assets from its mean value ß over
the entire period. 
In Figure 3 and equation (12) variable RENTPRICE
is the normalized return, measured in units of stan-
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dard deviation from the mean ß. It is equal to the 
ratio of (rental income/index of housing prices –
mean)/standard deviation. 
(12) N(f**(t)) = [Y(t)/P(t) – mean]/st. dev. ~ [(ß(t) – ß)] 
/ σ(ß) = RENTPRICE 
Variable N(f**(t)) in equation (12) is proportional to
an upper bound of the optimal debt ratio in equation
(9b). Both the actual (DEBTRATIO) and optimal
(RENTPRICE) are graphed in normalized form in
Figure 3.
The next question is how to estimate the excess debt
Ψ(t). I estimate excess debt Ψ(t) = (f(t) – f**(t)) by
using the difference between two normalized variables
N(f(t)) – N(f*(t)), see equation (13). This difference is
measured in standard deviations.
(13) Excess Debt Ψ(t) = N[f(t)] – N[f*(t)] = 
DEBTRATIO – RENTPRICE.
Excess Debt Ψ(t) corresponds to the difference between
the two curves DEBTRATIO and RENTPRICE in
Figure 3. The probability of a decline in net worth is
positively related to Ψ(t) the excess debt because, as the
excess debt rises, the expected growth declines.
In the most general way, Figure 3 should be viewed as
follows. Assume that over the entire period 1980–2007
the debt ratio was not excessive. Both variables are
normalized to make them comparable. When the
DEBTRATIO is above (below) its mean, the RENT-
PRICE should be above (below) its mean. When the
debt ratio rose significantly above a proxy for an
upper bound of the optimal debt ratio, the RENT-
PRICE declined below the mean. From 1996 and by
2007 it was 1.5 standard deviations below the mean.
The actual debt ratio DEBTRATIO grew steadily
above the mean from 1998, and by 2007 was 2 stan-
dard deviations above the mean. Thus the excess debt
grew to 3 standard deviations above the mean
from1998 to 2007.
The normalized actual debt ratio got out of line with
the normalized proxy for an upper bound of the opti-
mal debt ratio. The latter reflects the ‘fundamentals’.
The sequence of excess debts Ψ(t) is a clear measure
of a bubble. The actual debt was induced by capital
gains in excess of the interest rate. The debt could
only be serviced from capital gains. This situation is
unsustainable. When the capital gains fell below the
interest rate, the debts could not be serviced from
income. A crisis was inevitable.
The advantages of using excess debt Ψ(t) in Figure 3
as an Early Warning Signal compared to just the ratio
of housing price/disposable income are that Ψ(t)
focuses upon the fundamental determinants of the
optimal debt ratio as well as upon the actual ratio.
The probability of declines in net worth, the inability
of the mortgagors to service their debts and the finan-
cial collapse and a crisis due to leverage, are directly
related to the excess debt. 
Conclusions
The Jackson Hole Consensus
(JHC) has been the prevailing
regulatory approach taken by the
Fed. It is based upon three prin-
ciples. Central banks (i) should
not target asset prices; (ii) should
not try to prick an asset price
bubble; and (iii) should follow a
‘mopping up’ strategy after the
bubble bursts by injecting enough
liquidity to avoid serious effects
upon the real economy. A justifi-
cation for this policy was seen in
the period 2000–2002 with the
collapse of the dot.com bubble. 
Issing (2010) objects to the JHC
because it constitutes an asym-
Notes: Excess debt Ψ(t) = N[f(t)] – N[f*(t)]; N[f(t)] = DEBTRATIO = (household debt as per-
cent of disposable income – mean)/standard deviation; N[f**t)] = RENTPRICE = (rental
income/housing price index – mean)/standard deviation.


















Figure 3metric approach. When asset prices rise without infla-
tionary effects measured by the CPI, this is deemed
irrelevant for monetary policy. But when the bubble
bursts, central banks must come to the rescue. This, he
argues, produces a moral hazard. He wrote: “did we
really need a crisis that brought the world to the brink
of a financial meltdown to learn that the philosophy
which was at the time seen as state of the art was in
fact dangerously flawed? We must conduct a thorough
discussion as to appropriate strategy of central banks
with respect to asset prices”.
Greenspan argues that the crisis was unpredictable. It
is ironic that the Fed claims that it can use the Federal
Funds rate to target inflation or to stabilize the econ-
omy but asserts that the financial crisis was unpre-
dictable and inevitable. On the other hand, on the
basis of the SOC analysis in this paper, the sequence
excess debts Ψ(t) from 2003 in Figure 3 was an early
warning signal of a crisis.
The Dodd-Frank bill authorizes the Fed to perform
market surveillance. I explain why the application of
stochastic optimal control (SOC) is an effective
approach to determine the optimal degree of leverage,
the optimum and excessive risk, the optimum
risk/expected return trade-off and EWS of the proba-
bility of a debt crisis. A similar analysis was applied to
the Asian crisis in Stein (2006). This SOC analysis
should be used by those charged with surveillance of
financial markets. 
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